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Introduction
The integration of the financial industry in the European Union is at the forefront of the public policy debate. Integration of financial markets is perceived as an essential part of the process of real economic integration within European markets. The European financial industry has followed a cyclical pattern of M&A activity during the last decade. have also highlighted how integration at the European level is still subject to considerable institutional and nationalistic barriers [European Commission (2005) ].
The underlying motives for engaging in an M&A transaction have to deal with the efficiency gains reflected in lower costs and higher profits involved in the merger, the geographical diversification generated from the merger, the improvement in the competitive position, and the increase in the ability to generate value to consumer by the cross-selling of products. In addition, pre-emption motives may be behind some mergers that appear to reduce profits [Stennek, (2006 
. Studies of merger activity point to efficiency gains as the major source of value creation, while the net increase in revenue generated from the merger tends to be small [Houston and Ryngaert (1994) ]. However, it is difficult to find strong statistical evidence for the existence of these efficiency gains. Studies looking at the source of value creation in M&As in the European financial industry are inconclusive at best.
In a study of value creation to shareholders upon announcement of an M&A transaction Beitel and Schiereck (2001) report that returns to shareholders of the acquiring firm tend to be negative as the size of the acquiring bank increases. In a similar event study analysis of 54 M&As deals in 13 European banking markets, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) find a positive and significant increase in stock market value at the time of the deal announcement except in the subsample of cross-border deals 3 . Campa and Hernando (2006) find a post-merger improvement in the profitability performance of acquired banks relative to the 1. This opposition is not only circumscribed to the banking establishment. Thus, for instance, the recent approval by the Bank of Italy of the acquisition of BNL by BNP has also generated criticisms among political parties and consumer associations.
2. The underlying idea is that in some cases the relevant alternative to which compare the potential benefits of a merger deal from the acquirer's point of view is an alliance of their competitors rather than the absence of any merger process. In other words, when certain developments increases the likelihood of merger processes in a given industry, being an insider might reduce profits less than being an outsider. 3. Similarly, Campa and Hernando (2004) show that international mergers within Europe destroy shareholder value, especially in regulated industries. sector. In particular, we go beyond shareholder value creation for the firms involved and evaluate value creation in the industry. We use an indirect approach: rather than focusing on the reaction of the prices of the merging firms upon the deal announcement, we look at the response of other participants in the market. We first look at the changes in recommendations by industry analysts and then at the stock price reaction of the rival companies. We follow an event study methodology based on stock prices reaction to merger announcements. This strategy complements other approaches used in the industrial organization literature based on the analysis of the changes in balance-sheets, costs or profits resulting from merger processes. The event study methodology is well suited to avoid the problem of holding constant other factors that are usually present in other ex-post studies of merger effects [Caves (1989) ].
One of the weaknesses often highlighted of event-study results is that stock market prices over short windows may not be a good reflection of the full value of the merger.
This critique has two variants. Skeptics of the efficiency of financial markets view event studies focus on short-term windows around announcement as a poor reflection of the true value added for the firms involved in these complex transactions 6 . A second line of critique does not focus on the methodology but rather on the narrow definition of value creation.
Event studies, with their focus on shareholder value creation for the firms involved, are only a partial measure of the economic value created from a transaction. In particular, it does not take into account the resulting value created to consumers through competition enhancement in the industry. Therefore, the results from this type of analysis are likely to provide poor guidance for the evaluation of the attractiveness of these transactions.
We tackle the first critique in two ways. First, we look at a longer time horizon, one-year, to evaluate the stock market performance and its implication from the merger.
Most important, we go further and study the changes in perception by industry analysts of the expected returns to shareholders after the announcement. Changes in analyst recommendations have been shown to be predictors of future excess performance. To the extent that consensus exists that market prices do not reflect the expected returns from the merger, analysts as informed agents should change their recommendations on these stocks. We find little evidence in this regard. Analysts do not alter their recommendations in a manner significantly different after the merger announcement than around other periods in which no similar news occur. This evidence suggests that stock market prices react fairly fast to all the relevant information for expected returns from the merger announcement.
In the second part of the paper we confront the second critique above. We analyze whether the increase in concentration arising from the domestic consolidation process that has taken place has resulted in a significant change in the competitive environment in the financial industry. We evaluate the stock-market reaction by competing firms around the announcement of a transaction. There is a long history starting with Eckbo (1983) and Stillman (1983) of looking at the reaction of the stock market price of competing firms to evaluate the likely gains from a merger 7 . The key point in this literature is that when a merger is expected to decrease competition, industry margins are expected to increase and therefore, returns to shareholders of all the firms in the industry should also increase.
However, when the merger is expected to foster competition, its announcement should cause a fall in the stock market price of competing firms. We follow this literature and evaluate the reaction by competing firm stocks around a merger announcement.
We generally find a positive correlation between excess returns of the merging firms and those of their competitors, which indicates that market power might increase as a result of these transactions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample of M&As deals used in the event studies, and the details on the data from competing firms and analysts coverage. Section 3 presents the results on the reaction by analysts' recommendations upon announcement. Section 4 presents the results of the analysis on excess returns of competing firms around announcements. Section 5 concludes the paper.
7. See also Eckbo (1992) and Singal (1996) . Sample of M&A transactions (within SIC 60 to 67) and both were publicly traded companies. We excluded those deals in which either the target or the acquirer was a real state company and those transactions in which the buyer already owned 50% of the targeted company. We also decided to drop from the sample some outliers in terms of the excess returns of either the acquirer or the target firms 9
. As a result we conclude with a final sample of 218 transactions. Table 1 provides some information on the sample composition. We performed event studies around the announcement date of the merger (t).
We obtained the cumulative excess returns to the target and acquirer through three . This sample and information of excess returns conforms our reference sample for competing firms and analysts coverage. Table 2 reports summary statistics on excess returns to targets and acquirers.
Target companies experienced a positive excess return around the announcement of the merger. This excess return was on average 3.38% from the day prior to the merger announcement to the day after the announcement. An asymmetry is observed in the 11. We also calculated excess returns as the difference between actual returns and a measure of expected returns calculated using the CAPM during the six months prior to the event window and the results were qualitatively similar. Additionally, we also used the financial industry index as the relevant market index. This also had no substantial implications on the results. See Campa and Hernando (2006) for details.
smaller. There is a higher proportion of target firms that experience positive excess returns with this proportion fluctuating, depending on the window, between 51% and 60% of all targets.
For acquirers the distribution of excess returns around announcement is substantially different. Average excess returns are negative, with the exception of the pre-announcement window, and of the order of -1%. There does not appear to be any significant excess return during the run-up period prior to announcement. Long-run returns are also negative although unsignificant. Excess returns to acquirers experienced a wide dispersion around the average number. The median excess return is very close to zero in most cases.
In fact, the percentage of acquirers that experienced positive excess returns is around 50%
for all windows.
We compare excess returns in terms of the geographical scope of the merger and the size of the deal, measured by the joint market capitalization of the merging companies.
Value creation is expected to be lower in cross-border deals. Such deals usually offer lower potential synergies than domestic deals and are less likely to affect industry competition.
Cross-country differences in safety net characteristics that result in different risk-taking activities could also give rise to some premia for institutions moving to countries with a different degree of safety net [Hovakimian et al. (2003) ]. We find that excess returns to targets are substantially lower in cross-border mergers than in domestic deals, especially when measured by median values. The magnitude of this difference is especially high over the pre-announcement window and over the long-run post-announcement window. Average and median excess returns to targets are higher than those to acquirers in domestic mergers.
The difference in excess returns for acquirers between domestic and international deals depends on the window considered.
In terms of deal size, small (large) mergers include those transactions in the lower (upper) quartile of the distribution. The differences by size are quite striking, especially in the long-run. Short-run excess returns to targets are somewhat higher in small deals while the opposite is true for acquirers. The differences are much larger over the long-run window.
Small deals had an average (median) excess return for shareholders of the target firm of -1% (-7%) and an average (median) excess return of -11% (-2%) for the shareholders of the acquirer. In contrast, excess returns in large deals were substantially higher both for targets and acquirers: average (median) excess return were 2% (4%) for shareholders of the target firms and 6% (7%) for those of the acquiring companies. These results are consistent with Kane (2000) who suggests that large deals generate high excess returns because the resulting institution may benefit from being "too big to discipline adequately". Analysts' recommendations
Information from analysts' recommendations has been used often as a source of information for predicting returns. There is consensus in the literature that the level of analysts' recommendations, although it may help in predicting future returns, does not result in strategies that could be implemented to generate excess returns. Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman (2001) show in a large sample of over 360,000 analysts' recommendations that buying a portfolio of firms with a buy recommendation resulted in a higher return than buying a portfolio of firms with a sell recommendation. However, the strategy of shorting the latter portfolio to buy the portfolio of highly recommended firms did not result in positive excess returns after transaction costs. While investment strategies based on analyst consensus do not generate excess returns, positive excess returns are observed when the strategy picks portfolios based on changes in recommendations by analysts. Along this line, Stickel (1995) and Womack (1996) It is important to stress that these data do not measure the quality of the companies in absolute terms but in relation to their market price. Thus, a good recommendation means that the analyst considers that the company is undervalued in the market and therefore 12. For the deals announced over the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] we only know the average number of analysts following the stock and the average score. 13. More precisely, the set of recommendations, each with an assigned numeric value, is as follows: (1) strong buy, (2) buy, (3) hold, (4) underperform, and (5) sell.
he/she recommends buying this share at the current price. Similarly, a change in the recommendation around the announcement date can be interpreted as the analyst perception of how the deal is going to affect the performance of the company. Nevertheless, changes in recommendations have to be interpreted with caution as they probably are accompanied by changes in shares prices. Table 3 reports the evidence on analysts recommendations the month prior to the announcement of the deal. Three conclusions can be extracted from this evidence.
First, the average recommendation for acquirers is slightly better than that for targets, although the difference is only marginally significant. This difference between average recommendations of targets and acquirers is mainly due to the ratings of companies involved in cross-border deals. Second, acquirers in international mergers had better ratings than their targets in over 60% of the cases. In contrast, the average recommendation of both firms in domestic transactions is quite similar. Third, the average recommendation for targets is not significantly different around the merger announcement from what is observed in non-announcement periods. The last three rows of Table 3 report the mean and the median of average recommendations for the target and acquirer firms in the months in which they
were not involved in a transaction
14
. The mean (median) of average recommendations for target firms in non-announcement periods was 2.62 (2.62) while in the periods around which the takeover took place was 2.59 (2.65). One cannot conclude from this evidence that target firms get acquired when analysts consider that the firm is undervalued.
Focusing only in the subset of banking deals, there is no significant difference in the average score between targets and acquirers. This is explained by slightly better recommendations for targets in domestic deals and significantly better ratings for acquirers in cross-border deals. Moreover, average recommendations for targets in domestic deals are significantly better than recommendations during the periods in which no transaction takes place. The opposite is true in cross-border deals.
As discussed above, changes in analyst recommendations are better in predicting excess returns. Therefore, a comparison of changes in recommendations around the announcement dates is potentially more informative than the analysis of average recommendations performed so far. column can be seen as a benchmark for comparison on the significance of these changes in recommendations. The distribution of observations right before the merger according to the existence of changes in recommendations and the sign of these changes is very similar to the distribution of observations in non-announcement periods. In these non-announcement periods, the number of companies/periods pairs that display a change in a recommendation is approximately one third. This number gets split in around 12% that display uniform downgrades, 11% that show uniform upgrades and 10% that display changes in recommendations of both signs 16 . Interestingly, both in the only upgrades and the only downgrades subsamples, the percentages of analyst changing their recommendations is just around 10%. Moreover, the fraction of observations where more than 20% (or 50%) of analysts change recommendation is very small.
The fraction of observations without changes in the period just prior to announcement is smaller for acquirers. However, these firms experience a higher fraction of uniform upgrading. In the case of targets, the fraction of observations with changes of recommendations of opposite sign is lower. Moreover, for those observations with uniform downgrading the average fraction of analysts changing their recommendations (22%) is higher than in the case of non-announcement observations (around 10%).
More surprisingly, the distribution of changes in recommendations after the announcement, and the sign of these changes, is again very similar to the distribution of observations in non-announcement periods. The fraction of target observations with changes of recommendations of opposite sign is lower, especially for the mergers involving banks.
There is a higher fraction of uniform upgrading and a lower fraction of uniform downgrading among acquiring firms but in this case the average fraction of analysts changing their recommendations is higher.
Finally, looking at the changes in recommendations over the first four months after the announcement of the deal we observe that the proportion of observations without changes in recommendations is smaller. This is not surprising given the longer length of the time interval. However, the fraction of observations with changes of recommendations of opposite sign is higher suggesting that there is no consensus among analysts even four months after the announcement of the transaction.
To summarize, changes in recommendations on firms involved in merger deals are not exceptionally frequent. There are no uniform patterns in changes in recommendations across analysts. The fraction of average downgrades and upgrades around announcement dates is not substantially different from those observed in non-announcement periods.
Overall, we interpret this "lack of reaction" by analysts as being consistent with the hypothesis that the transaction on average is "fairly priced" and that stock market prices after the announcement reflect all relevant information on the assets. Finally, a note of caution.
Analysts affiliated with companies acting as financial adviser to the merging firms in each transaction can not issue recommendations on the merging companies during the merging process. To the extent that these analysts have more information on the likely outcome of the merger process, the evidence presented here maybe underestimating the impact on expected performance by analysts 17 .
16. Similar figures are found when we restrict our analysis to the sample of completed banking deals. 17. It would also be interesting to analyse whether local analysts, that a priori may have better information, are more likely to change their recommendations in reaction to a merger announcement. The idea that local analysts have better
The Stock Market Reaction of Competing Firms
The analysis of the stock market reaction of rival companies to merger announcements might be useful to identify the underlying rationale for integration deals. The use of competitors' data to determine the ultimate impact on competition from the merger was pioneered by Eckbo (1983) and Stillman (1983) . Value creation from M&As arising from efficiency gains should result in a negative correlation between excess returns of the merging firms and those of their competitors. Efficiency enhancements by a competitor are likely to result in a more competitive environment proving more difficult, at least in the short run, for existing firms to maintain their profitability. In contrast, to the extent that M&As result in an increase in concentration and a decline in the intensity of competition, the stock of competing firms should react positively as value to their shareholders will likely increase in the future.
Moreover, to the extent that domestic deals are more likely to lead to industry consolidation and as a result affect market competition, we can expect, on average, higher excess returns to the shareholders of rival companies in domestic deals. By contrast, the entry of foreign banks, as a result of cross-border deals, may foster competition inducing local banks to innovate and improve service quality. As Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) shows, foreign ownership of banks is usually negatively correlated with domestically owned banks' profitability and margins.
Focusing on the analysis of stock market reaction of rival companies limits theevaluation of competition to only publicly-traded competitors. In some segments of the financial industry -such as retail banking-a substantial share of the market is controlled by non-quoted companies (i.e. savings banks or cooperative banks), particularly in certain countries. Therefore, in these cases our approach does not capture the competitive impact of the merger in a substantial fraction of the competitors. It is also worth mentioning that in some countries these non-quoted companies have important limitations on the admissible changes in their ownership structure, this being an important obstacle to the integration of these market segments at the European level.
We define the set of competing firms as all the companies belonging to the same financial service industry 18 listed in the same country as the target company.
We assume that any impact on competition will likely take place in the market of the acquired company. For domestic mergers, this is not controversial since the relevant market is the same for the acquirer and target firms. This is not true for international mergers. 19. Note that this assumption will be more adequate in those industries that are geographically segmented like retail banking. However, the assumption is less satisfactory in those industry segments that are more integrated or where the cross-border service provision is more relevant.
For each set of competing firms, we compute the excess return to shareholders around the same windows as we did for the firms involved in the M&A transaction 20 . This provides us with a sample of excess returns of competing firms for every transaction.
Summary statistics for the average of these excess returns are reported in the last three columns of Table 2 . Overall, we find that average and median excess returns are predominantly positive although close to zero. Interestingly, we find that average and median excess returns for the announcement window are small but significantly positive, both for the total sample and for domestic deals. These results might indicate that merger deals have led to a reduction in the level of competition. We also find that long-run average excess returns for competing firms are positive, although not statistically significant given the wide dispersion across companies. Consistently with the hypothesis of an anticompetitive rationale for merger deals, we find that, with the exception of the pre-announcement window, domestic deals tend to generate higher excess returns for rival companies than cross-border deals, the difference being particularly sizeable for the long-run window.
In contrast, the comparison of rivals' excess returns in terms of the size of the deals does not offer conclusive results.
Positive excess returns to competing firms around merger announcements are also compatible with increases in the probability that these competing firms may themselves become targets of future M&A deals. M&A transactions are clustered over time, and we do find evidence in Table 2 of positive excess returns to targets prior to the announcement of a transaction. Under this explanation, investors, given the announcement of a transaction, would boost valuations of competing firms in the expectation of further transactions at higher prices. This explanation relies on a rationale for why further transactions would occur at higher prices. Under efficient markets, higher prices can only be supported by the expectation of higher future cash-flows for the firms involved. This is precisely the anticompetitive hypothesis being tested.
We also look at the fraction of competitors which display positive abnormal returns, over different windows around merger deals announcements. According to the hypothesis of increases in market power, we should expect a high fraction of companies displaying positive excess returns and this fraction should be lower for cross-border deals.
Results along this line are reported in Table 5 According to the hypothesis of market power gains, the partial correlation between the excess returns of merging firms and those of their competitors should also be positive.
To test this hypothesis, we regress the estimated excess returns of the merging firms over 20. Excess returns for competing firms are computed as the difference between the stock market return of each firm minus the return of the national stock market index during the same period.
the average excess return of their competitors. Our goal in doing this regression is not to establish a causal relationship between excess returns of target and competing firms.
The purpose is exclusively to evaluate to what extent the reported correlation is robust to the inclusion of additional controls. We also included a number of other control variables including a set of year dummies, a dummy for the geographical scope (DOMESTIC), the relative size of the merging firms (RSIZE) and dummies for the top and bottom quartile of absolute size of the deal (LARGEDEAL and SMALLDEAL). Results are reported in Table 6 .
We generally find a positive correlation between target excess returns and those of their competitors, although it is not significant for the window [t-1, t+1]. Similarly, we also find a positive correlation between acquirer excess returns and those of their competitors, although it is again not significant for the announcement window [t-1, t+1]. This evidence points towards a positive correlation between merging firms' and rivals' returns around the announcement period. This evidence would be consistent with the hypothesis that market power increases as a result of these transactions.
We would also expect this effect to be more prevalent for domestic than for international transactions. We test this hypothesis by including an interaction term between the average competitors' excess return and the dummy for domestic deals (DOM_RIV).
The evidence is only weakly favorable to this hypothesis. Both for targets and acquirers, the interaction term is predominantly positive and it is significant over the long-run window, which implies a higher correlation between merging firms' and rivals' returns in domestic mergers.
For the long-run window [t-1, t+360] the correlation between target firms' and rivals' excess returns is positive and significant for domestic mergers while for cross-border mergers is not Table 6 . By construction this effect is less likely in the shorter windows, where we still find the positive correlation. We view this evidence jointly with the significant positive mean excess returns for competitors around announcement reported earlier as supportive of the impact that the announcement of these transactions has on expected returns to rivals.
21. We would also expect that the positive correlation between excess returns of merging and competing firms be more relevant in larger deals, since larger deals are more likely to have an impact on industry competition. However, the interaction between the average competitors' excess return and the deal size turned out to be unsignificant for all the windows. The paper also analyses the stock market reaction of competing firms around a merger announcement. This is an empirical approach that has been often used to assess the likely impact of the transaction on competition. By looking at the rivals' stock market reaction we pursue a further analysis of the underlying motives for engaging in an M&A process. We find a positive correlation between excess returns of the merging firms and those of their competitors, consistent with the idea that market power might have increased as a result of these transactions. Moreover, we also find evidence that returns to competing firms upon announcement differ between domestic and international mergers. The correlation between long-run excess returns for acquirers and competing firms is positive for domestic mergers and significantly higher than for international mergers. This is consistent with the hypothesis that domestic mergers were more likely to decrease industry competition. (3) (1) */** denote significance at the 10%/5% level. Confidence intervals on the distribution of excess returns have been adjusted for skewness following the methods described in Lyon et al. (1999) .
(2) */** denote significance at the 10%/5% level. Year dummies not reported * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 6 . Regression analysis of excess returns
Targets Acquirers
The dependent variable are estimated excess returns around the announcement of the transaction relative to the performance of the national financial market index, over the window in days indicated in the top of the column. DOMESTIC is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the transaction involves two companies of the same country. BANKS is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the transaction involves two banks. RSIZE is defined as: ((tmv/(tmv+amv)-0.5)**2) where tmv and amv denote the market capitalisation of the target and acquiring companies. SMALLDEAL (LARGEDEAL) is a dummy that take the value of 1 if the joint market capitalization of the involved companies is in the first(fourth) quartile of the distribution. RIVALS_ER is the average excess returns of the set of potential competitors and DOM RIV is the interaction of RIVALS ER and DOMESTIC.
